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Introduction
Over the past decade, violent secessionist struggles have taken place in Kosovo and in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Whereas Kosovo successfully declared independence
from its mother State, Serbia, in 2008, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have officially
remained an integral part of their mother State, Georgia. 1 The two conflicts highlight
the tension between the principle of territorial integrity on the one hand, and the
need to protect minority rights on the other. Preserving the territorial integrity of
mother States would lead toward denying remedial secession to struggling minority
groups and arguably thereby refusing to respect minority rights. Allowing minorities
to secede, in the goal ofhaving their rights to self-determination fulfilled, would lead
toward disrupting the territorial integrity of mother States. How can we reconcile the
principle of territorial integrity with minority rights, and in particular, with the idea
of self-determination - that every "people" ought to have a nation State?

•

Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. J.D., Cornell Law
School & Universite Paris I-Pantheone-Sorbonne, summa cum laude; Master's Degree,
Private International Law, Universite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne, cum /aude. The
author would like to thank the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Library for outstand
ing research assistance.
See infra Parts 3 and 4.

103
Baltic Yearbook ofInternational Law. Volume 12. 2012, ISBN: 978-90-04-24841-0, pp. 103-130.
Copyright 2013 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in The Netherlands.

Milena Sterio

This article will argue that territoriality and minority rights can work in tandem,
because most secessionist claims by minority groups involve claims to territory.
Thus, territoriality and minority rights are both about land, and the relevant inquiry
should be whether to alter the status quo, at the expense of a mother State's terri
tory and in order to accommodate minority rights. This paper seeks to answer this
difficult question in the context of recent secessionist struggles in Kosovo and in
Georgia. Part 2 will discuss the principle of territorial integrity under international
law, before turning to a discussion of minority rights, and in particular, the principle
of self-determination. Part 3 will focus on Kosovo and will describe the recent war
in this region, leading toward the Kosovar unilateral declaration of independence in
2008. Part 4 will similarly focus on Georgia, and will describe the recent conflicts in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Part 5 will attempt to propose a reconciliation between
territoriality and minority rights, by comparing the conflicts in Kosovo and Georgia,
by arguing that the conflicts have produced different results because of politics, not
because of law, and by outlining principles which could be relevant in examining
future secessionist struggles. This article concludes that the international community
should rely on objective legal criteria in judging the validity of secessionist struggles,
rather than drawing conclusions based on political calculus.

2.
Territoriality versus Minority Rights
The principles of territorial integrity of States and of minority rights may seem at
odds in certain situations. If the need to respect minority rights rises to the level of
secession -that is, ifthe minority group's rights are being abused by the mother State,
or if the minority group no longer wishes to continue its existence within the mother
State for other justifiable reasons - then respect for minority rights may trump the
territorial integrity of the mother State. Conversely, if the territorial integrity of the
mother State is preserved at all cost, this may at times lead toward a denial of protec
tions and basic rights of the minority group. According to Lea Brilmayer, "[i]f ...
territorial integrity takes priority, then minority groups within the existing state will
be denied their cherished claims to independence". 2 The two seemingly conflicting
principles, territorial integrity and minority rights, will be examined in sections 2.1
and 2.2 below.

2.1.

Territorial Integrity

The principle of territorial integrity is one of the basic tenets of international law; it
is, according to Catherine Iorns, "a fundamental norm of the present world system of
states and state sovereignty".3

2
3

L. Brilmayer, 'Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation', 16 Yale
J. Int'/ L. (1991) p. 177, at p. 178.
Catherine J. Iorns, 'Indigeous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State', 24

Case Western Reserve J. Int'IL. (1992) p. 199, at p. 330.
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Article 2 of the United Nations Charter reaffirms the primacy of States' territo
rial integrity by prohibiting States from using force against the territorial integrity
of any other State.4 The same Article also stipulates that "[n]othing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state", unless the Security Council
has effectively trumped State sovereignty through the exercise of its Chapter VII
powers. 5 A traditional interpretation of the phrase "within the domestic jurisdiction
of any State" would posit that "domestic jurisdiction" translated into territorial bor
ders. In other words, matters that are within a domestic jurisdiction of any State are
almost always those that occur within the territory of that State. Thus, a State's ter
ritorial integrity is protected from outside interference by the United Nations or by
any individual member State of the United Nations. It is only through intervention
by the Security Council that a State's territorial integrity may be breached, under a
traditional interpretation of the United Nations Charter.6
Moreover, territory is one of the basic requirements of statehood. According to
the 1933 Montevideo Convention, an entity can achieve statehood if it fulfils four
criteria: if it has a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and the
capacity to enter into international relations.7 Statehood is a legal theory that seeks
to justify its attribution on objective criteria, which are at least in theory independent
from the political reality underlying many attempts at the creation of a State-like
entity through secession or separation. 8 The requirement of territory is thus a basic
criterion of the normative theory of statehood. A State cannot exist without a defined
territory. Consequently, an attempt to disrupt State territory through the respect of
minority rights via secession would violate the existing rules of State sovereignty.

4

5
6

7
8

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their interna
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations".
UN Charter, Article 2(7).
See e.g. P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edi
tion (1996) pp. 306-309 (noting that the UN Charter outlaws "all uses of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state unless authorized by the
Security Council or taken in self-defense".); see also T. Farer, 'A Paradigm ofLegitimate
Intervention', in L. F. Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in
Internal Conflicts (1993) p. 316, at pp. 320-322 ("Article 2(4) prohibits force or the threat
thereof against the political independence or territorial integrity of a state or for any
other end inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.").
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 1, 165 U.NT.S. 19
(1933) (hereinafter "Montevideo Convention").
In fact, Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states that "[t]he political existence of
the state is independent of recognition by the other states". Montevideo Convention,
ibid., Article 3.
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The International Court of Justice {ICJ) has reaffirmed the principle of territo
rial integrity through its protection of the principle of sanctity of borders, or uti pos
sidetis. In a case concerning a border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, two
African States whose boundaries had been determined by their pre-independence
colonial borders, the ICJ upheld the principle of uti possidetis. The ICJ stated that
this was a general principle of international law, and that "[i]ts obvious purpose is
to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratri
cidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of
the administering power".9 According to the Court, the principle of uti possidetis'
essence "lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at
the moment when independence is achieved".1° The Court recognized that the prin
ciple of uti possidetis may appear contradictory to the right of self-determination of
peoples. However, the Court stated that the maintenance of the territorial status quo
in Africa is the wisest solution to preserve those rights that the struggling peoples
have already achieved, and to prevent further chaos. "The essential requirement of
stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate their indepen
dence in all fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent to the respecting
of colonial frontiers, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle
of self-determination of peoples." 11 Under this holding of the ICJ, the principle of
self-determination should be interpreted within the paradigm of the preservation of
territorial status quo of existing States. In fact, African States had already adopted
this view during decolonization in the 1960s. In 1964, the Organization of African
Unity issued a decision which reaffirmed "respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each State". 12
The issue of borders and territorial integrity was recently debated during the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. First, the Security Council and the European
Community political bodies issued statements in 1991 reminding all parties to the
conflict that changes to the existing borders (of the former Yugoslavia) could not
occur by force.13 Then, in 1992, the Badinter Commission, a body of experts com
missioned to answer difficult legal issues surrounding Yugoslavia's break-up, issued
an opinion on the issue of borders between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herze
govina.14 The Badinter Commission emphasized that, according to the ICJ ruling
in the Brukina Faso v. Mali case, discussed above, the principle of uti possidetis is

9
10
11
12
13
14
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Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 19861.C.J. 554, para. 20
(Dec. 22).
Ibid., at para. 23.
Ibid., at para. 25.
O.A.U. Res. AGH/RES.16(1) (1964).
J. L. Dunoff et al., International Law: Norms, Actors, Process, 2nd edition (2006) at pp.
108-109.
Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3, 31 I.L.M 1499
(1992).
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recognized as a general principle of international law. 15 Moreover, the Badinter Com
mission affirmed the existence ofthe principle of respect for the territorial status quo
of existing borders, and concluded that "alteration of existing frontiers or boundaries
by force is not capable of producing any legal effect". 16 According to the Badinter
Commission, a secessionist claim to territory has no legal effect on the existing ter
ritorial borders.17 Thus, State territorial integrity trumps minority claims for separa
tion and secession.
Despite the positive law on territorial integrity discussed above, scholars have
argued that the existing system ofborders and territory is morally arbitrary. 18 Accord
ing to some scholars, there are no true moral justifications for the international rule
that upholds the territorial integrity of presently existing States. In fact, many pres
ent States acquired territory through the conquest of indigenous peoples, 19 and many
post-colonial State borders were created arbitrarily, through peace treaties among
former colonizers. Thus, according to these scholars, one of the primary factors dis
cussed within issues of minority rights and secession is the justification of territo
rial claims. "We must reinstate the human rights component of self-determination,
and reinstate the belief that the state exists for the benefit of people, rather than the
reverse." 20
However, the above view is not uniform among courts, scholars and certainly
not State governments. The current state of international law would uphold the prin
ciple of territorial integrity, and view any claim of protection of minority rights
through secession with scepticism.21 Absent extra-ordinary circumstances, territo
rial integrity trumps a claim of secession by a minority group. The principle of self
determination for peoples, discussed below, leads toward remedial secession only in
exceptional cases.

2.2.
Minority Rights
Under modern-day international law, minority groups' rights are protected from
abuse by their mother States, and are guaranteed the respect of basic rights. 22 For
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
C. R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (1979) pp. 136-143.
lorns, supra note 2, at p. 338.
Ibid.
See e.g. D. Horowitz, 'A Right to Secede?', in S. Macedo and A. Buchanan (eds.), Seces
sion and Self-Determination (2003) p. 50, at pp. 55, 59 ("Secession would not be a way
ofrectifying boundaries, because there are not truly natural land boundaries ... A seces
sion or partition converts a domestic ethnic dispute into a more dangerous international
one.") ("The support in international law for even a limited right to secede is very thin,
indeed.").
On the status of minority rights generally, see D. Wippman, 'The Evolution and Imple
mentation of Minority Rights', 66 Ford L. Rev. (1999) p. 597.
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example, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that "[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right ... to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religious, or to use their own
language". 23 The Human Rights Committee issued a general comment in 1994 focus
ing on Article 27, in which it concluded that States had positive obligations to pro
tect minority rights. According to the Human Rights Committee, "[t]he protection of
these rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of
the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned". 24 Moreover,
minority rights are protected in the so-called "Copenhagen Document", an instru
ment prepared by the Conference (now Organization) on Security and Cooperation
in Europe at a 1990 meeting in Copenhagen devoted to human rights. 25 According
to the Copenhagen Document, "[p]ersons belonging to national minorities have the
right freely to express, preserve and develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or reli
gious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects, free of any
attempts at assimilation against their will". 26 Finally, minority rights are specifically
protected in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
a multilateral treaty resulting from the political commitments of States signatory
to the Copenhagen Document. 27 The Framework Convention guarantees to persons
belonging to ethnic minorities the right to equal treatment before the law, as well as
rights to use their language, to develop their culture and their identity, their religion,
traditions and cultural heritage. 28
In addition to minority rights that focus on the preservation of culture, tradition,
language and religion, one of the basic forms of respect for minority rights is the
claim for autonomy. The term "autonomy" generally underscores a form of political
or governmental autonomy. "Generally, autonomy is understood to refer to indepen
dence of action on the internal or domestic level ...We regard autonomy as a relative
term that describes the extent or degree of independence of a particular entity." 29
Autonomy does not imply that a territory where the minority group lives must be
independent from its mother State; rather, autonomy implies a form of self-govern
ment exercised by the minority group within the structure of the mother State. 30 The
concept of autonomy is inherent in the infamous principle of self-determination, the
idea that minority groups have a right to self-determine their political fate, despite
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, UN Doc. A/49/50 Vol. l, at 108 (1994).
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
the CSCE, 291.L.M 1305 (1990).
Ibid., at para. 32.
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 34 /.L.M 351 (1995).
Ibid., at Articles 4, 5 and 10.
H. Hannum and R. B. Lillich, 'The Concept of Autonomy in International Law', 74 Am.
J. Int'! L. (1980) p. 858,
Ibid.
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the wishes of their mother State. This article, when discussing minority rights, will
specifically focus on autonomy and the right to self-determination, and will, perhaps
regrettably, leave a more thorough discussion on any other forms of minority rights
to other academic endeavours.
The principle of self-determination has a long history and has been used and
discussed throughout the 20th century. It has evolved to be a norm of customary law,
and its contours represent a wide-ranging spectrum of alternatives for the minor
ity group seeking to self-determine its fate. Thus, self-determination rights for a
minority group may involve simply political and representative rights within a cen
tral State, on the one hand, or may amount to remedial secession and ultimately
independence, on the other hand.

2.3.
History ofSelf-Determination
Self-determination in international law is the legal right for a "people" 31 or a minor
ity group to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its sovereign. 32 As early as
1918-1919, leaders like Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson advanced the philoso
phy of self-determination, the former based on violent secession to liberate people
from bourgeois governments, and the latter based on the free will of people through
democratic processes. 33 Today, the principle of self-determination is embodied in

31

32

33

Although the term "people" is ambiguous and vague under international law, it typically
refers to "people who live within the same state ... or people organized into a state". Z.
Gruda, 'Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution of the Status of Kosova: Uti Pos
sedetis, 'The Ethnic Principle, and Self-Determination', 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (2005) p.
353, at p. 367. Thus, "people" is a legal rather than natural category. Moreover, the term
"people" has been purposely left undefined in international law, because if the right
to self-determination were to be applied broadly to all conceivable groups, this could
destabilise states and cause peace and security problems. B. S. Brown, Human Rights,
Sovereignty, and the Final Status of Kosovo, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (2005) p. 235, at p.
249.
The principle of self-determination was first elevated to the international plane by Presi
dent Woodrow Wilson, who included it in his infamous Fourteen Points. M. P. Scharf,
'Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings', 31 Denv. J. Jnt'l L. & Pol'y (2003) p. 373,
at p. 378. For a full discussion of the principle of self-determination, see Gruda, supra
note 31, at pp. 369-382.
M. J. Kelly, 'Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: "Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver"?
Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?', 10
UCLA J. Int'! & For. Aff. (2005) p. 361, at pp. 387-388.
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multiple international treaties and conventions,34 and has crystallized into a rule of
customary international law, binding on all States. 35
Under the principle of self-determination, a group with a common identity and
link to a defined territory is allowed to decide its political future in a democratic
fashion. 36 For a group to be entitled to exercise its collective right to self-determina
tion, it must qualify as a "people". 37 Traditionally, a two-part test has been applied to
determine when a group qualifies as a people.38 The first prong ofthe test is objective
and seeks to evaluate the group to determine to what extent its members "share a
common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history, and cultural heri
tage'', as well as "territorial integrity of the area the group is claiming". 39 The second
prong of the test is subjective and examines "the extent to which individuals within
the group self-consciously perceive themselves collectively as a distinct 'people,' and
"the degree to which the group can form a viable political entity".40
Self-determination of such groups that qualify as a people can be effectuated in
different ways: through self-government, autonomy, free association or, in extreme
cases, independence. Once the determination has been made that a specific group
qualifies as a people and thus has the right to self-determination, the relevant inquiry
becomes whether the right to self-determination creates a right to secession and

34

35

The term "self-determination" stems from Article 1 of the United Nations Charter,
which speaks ofthe "principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". Subse
quent declarations voted by the UN General Assembly also refer to the term "self-deter
mination." See e.g. Declaration on the Granting oflndependence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (1960) ("All peoples have the right to self-determination;
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development."); Declaration on Principles oflnternational
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (1970) ("The establishment of a
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent
State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people con
stitutes modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.").
Scharf, supra note 32, at p. 378; Legal Consequences for States ofthe Continued Pres

ence ofSouth Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 l.C.J. 16, 31-32 (June 21); Western Sahara, 197 l.C.J. 12,
31-33 (Oct. 16): Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Rep. of Mali), 1986
l.C.J. 554, 566-567 (Dec. 22); Concerning East Timar (Port. v. Aust!.), 1995 l.C.J. 90,
36
37
38

39
40

110

265-268 (Jun. 30).
Scharf, supra note 32, at p. 379.

Ibid.
Ibid. Note however that the term "people" has been purposely left undefined under inter
national law and that the tests seeking to determine when a group qualifies as a people
have been flexibly applied. See supra note 31.
Scharf, supra note 32, at p. 379.

Ibid.
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independence?f1 In other words, as mentioned above, the right to self-determination
can take different forms that are less intrusive on State sovereignty than secession
is. 42 Understandably, the international community views secession with suspicion,43
and traditionally the right to independence or secession as a mode of self-determi
nation has only applied to people under colonial domination or some kind of oppres
sion.44 However, the modern-day international law has come to embrace the right of
non-colonial people to secede from an existing State, "when the group is collectively
denied civil and political rights and subject to egregious abuses".45 This right has
become known as the "remedial" right to secession, and has its origin in the infa
mous 1920 Aaland Islands case. 46
The Aaland Islands were a small island group situated between Finland and
Sweden, belonging administratively to the former and seeking to reunite with the
latter. 47 In fact, the Aalanders claimed that they were ethnically Swedish, and that
they wished to break off from Finland - which had just seceded from Russia - and
to become a part of Sweden. 48 In an advisory opinion, the second Commission of
Rapporteurs operating within the auspices of the League of Nations held first that
this issue was properly of international, not domestic jurisdiction, and second that
the Aalanders had a right to a cultural autonomy, which had to be exercised within
41

42
43

44

45
46
47
48

Secession under international law refers to separation of a portion of an existing State,
whereby the separating entity either seeks to become a new State or to join yet another
State, and whereby the original State remains in existence without the breaking off ter
ritory. Successful secessions around the globe have been rare, because secession seems
inherently at odds with the principles of State sovereignty and territorial integrity, which
have been core values of international law for centuries. See e.g. Horowitz, supra note
21, at p. 69 (citing James Crawford to conclude that State practice and international law
show "the extreme reluctance of States to recognize or accept unilateral secession out
side the colonial context".).
Scharf, supra note 32, at p. 379.
Ibid., at p. 380 (noting that secession is "synonymous with the dismemberment ofsates").
Note the 1970 statement by then UN Secretary-General U. Thant: ''As far as the question
of secession of a particular section of a State is concerned, the United Nations attitude
is unequivocal. As an international organization, the United Nations has never accepted
and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of
a part of its Member States." 'Secretary-General's Press Conferences', in 7 UN Monthly
Chronicle 36 (Feb. 1970).
Scharf, supra note 32, at p. 380. Note that under this view the independence of a colony
was not considered a secession, because that term referred only to the separation from a
State of a portion of its domestic territory. Moreover, the international community has
also leaned on the theory of "salt-water colonialism," under which self-determination
only applied to lands separated from the metropolitan mother-state by oceans or seas.
Scharf, supra note 32, at p. 381.
Ibid.
Dunoff et al., supra note 13, at pp. 118-119.
Ibid., at p. 119.
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Finland. 49 Only if Finland disrespected their ethnic and cultural autonomy would the
Aalanders' right to separate from Finland be triggered. 50
Similarly, the 1970 Declaration on Principles oflnternational Law Concerning
Friendly Relations preconditions the right of non-colonial people to separate from
an existing State on the denial of the right to a democratic self-government by the
mother State. 51 A similar clause, striking a balance between the right to self-deter
mination and territorial integrity, was inserted in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the
World Conference on Human Rights, accepted by all UN member States. 52 Other UN
bodies have also referred to the right to remedial secession, such as the 1993 Report
of the Rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission Against the Discrimination and the
Protection of Minorities on Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful
and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, 53 and the General Rec

49

50

51

52

53
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The League of Nations created an International Committee of Jurists to determine
whether the League of Nations had jurisdiction over this issue, and the Committee's
report generally held that the League of Nations had such jurisdiction over this issue.
Report ofthe International Committee ofJurists Entrusted by the Council ofthe League
ofNations with the Task ofGiving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects ofthe
Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supp. No. 3, at
5-10 (1920). Then, the League of Nations appointed a Commission of Rapporteurs to
recommend a solution to the Aaland Islands problem, and the Rapporteurs report held
that "[t]he separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its incor
poration in another State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution,
a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and
effective guarantees". The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council
of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc.
B7/21/68/106 (1921) (hereinafter "Aaland Islands Report").
Aaland Islands Report, ibid. (holding that "in the event that Finalnd ... refused to grant
the Aaland population the guarantees which we have just detailed ... [t]he interests ofthe
Aalanders ... would then force us to advise the separation of the islands from Finland").
"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
of political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compli
ance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color." G.A. Res. 2625, UN GAOR,
25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights,
para. 2, UN doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), reprinted in 321.L.M 1661 (1993). Note that the
Vienna Declaration, unlike the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, "did not confine
the list of impermissible distinctions to those based on 'race, creed or color,' indicating
that distinctions based on religion, ethnicity, language or other factors would also trigger
the right to secede". Scharf, supra note 32, at p. 382.
Protection ofMinorities: Possible Ways and Means ofFacilitating the Peaceful and Con
structive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, Commission on Human Rights:
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ommendation XXI adopted in 1996 by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination. 54
The above documents demonstrate the reluctance of international law to accept
the right to self-determination for minority groups, absent exceptional circum
stances. And, as argued above, some scholars remain sceptical of the need to disrupt
territorial integrity of mother States, even in such exceptional cases. 55

2.4.

Recent Applications ofSelf-Determination Principles

Most recently, the Canadian Supreme Court dealt with the right to self-determination
regarding the proposed separation of Quebec from Canada.56 Embracing the Aaland
Islands precedent, the Canadian Supreme Court distinguished the right to internal
self-determination from the right to external self-determination. 57 While the former
refers to a level of provincial autonomy within the existing State (Canada in this
instance), including political, civic, cultural, religious and social rights, the latter
refers to the right to separate from the existing State in order to form a new, inde
pendent State. 58 The Canadian Supreme Court, like the League of Nations, held that
a people has a right to internal self-determination first, and that only if that right is
not respected by the mother State, the same people's right to break off may accrue. 59
In other words, the right to separate is conditioned on the non-respect of the right to
some form of provincial autonomy. 60

54
55
56
57
58

59

60

Sub-commission on Prevention and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Agenda Item
17, at para. 84, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (1993).
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN GAOR, 51st
Sess., Supp. No. 18 at 125-126, para.11, UN Doc. A/51118 (1996).
See e.g. Horowitz, supra note 21.
Reference re Secession ofQuebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
Ibid.
Ibid. (defining internal self-determination as "a people's pursuit of its political, eco

nomic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state'', and
defining external self-determination as potentially taking the form of secession, and as
arising "in only the most extreme of cases ... under carefully defined circumstances");
see also Gruda, supra note 31, at pp. 380-381 (detailing the content of the right to exter
nal self-determination and of the right to internal self-determination).
Reference re Secession ofQuebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 ("when a people is blocked from
the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last
resort, to exercise it by secession ... "). Note that the Canadian Supreme Court declined
to answer the issue of under what circumstances such a right to secession accrues, as it
determined that the population of Quebec is entitled to meaningful internal self-deter
mination and thus not in a position to claim the right to external self-determination.
Dunoff et al., supra note 13, at p. 222.
Reference re Secession ofQuebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (noting that when "the ability of
a people to exercise its right to self-determination internally is somehow being totally
frustrated", only then does the right to external self-determination accrue).
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Recent developments in international law may also lend credence to the idea
that the right to remedial secession has crystallized as a norm. As an example, in the
case of the former Yugoslavia, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Her
zegovina, and Macedonia were entitled to secede because they had been denied the
proper exercise of their right to democratic self-government, and, in some cases, had
been subject to ethnic violence by the central government in Belgrade.61
These authorities suggest that if a government is at the high end of the scale of
representative government, the only modes of self-determination that will be given
international backing are those with minimal destabilizing effect and achieved by
consent of all parties. If a government is extremely unrepresentative and abusive,
then much more potentially destabilizing modes of self-government, including
independence, may be recognized as legitimate. In the latter case, the secession
ist group would be fully entitled to seek and receive external aid, and third-party
states and organizations would have no duty to refrain from providing support. 62
Recent examples of Kosovo and Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) shed more
light on the debate over territorial integrity versus minority rights and will be dis
cussed below. These examples demonstrate that the winner in the battle between
territoriality and minority rights may depend entirely on the political will ofthe most
powerful external States. This article argues that it is the support of the powerful
super-States that seems to enable minority groups to secede from their mother State.
Thus, although the right to remedial secession may have crystallized into a norm of
customary law academically speaking, in practice, this right accrues only if there is
sufficient political support for the people at stake.

3.
l(osovo
Kosovo had been an autonomous province of Serbia, one of the six republics within
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 63 When the SFRY dissolved in
the early 1990s, Kosovo remained a part of the SFRY successor, the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY) first, then a part of Serbia and Montenegro, and when Monte
negro broke away from the latter, Kosovo remained a part of the sole Serbian State.64
Until the late 1980s, Kosovo had the status of an autonomous province within
the SFRY and exercised important regional self-governance functions. 65 More impor
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Scharf, supra note 32, at p. 384.
Brown, supra note 31, at p. 238.
Ibid., at pp. 238-240.
The 1974 SFRY Constitution granted Kosovo the status of an autonomous province
within the country's federal structure. Gruda, supra note 31, at p. 387. Under the terms
of the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo had the following rights: the right to adopt and change
its Constitution; the right to adopt laws; the right to exercise constitutional judicial func
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tantly, its predominantly ethnic Albanian population enjoyed multiple rights, such
as the right to education in the Albanian language, the right to Albanian language
media, the right to celebrate cultural holidays and to generally preserve its ethnic
structure and belonging.66 However, in response to ethnic Albanian uprising move
ments throughout Kosovo, staged by guerrilla-like paramilitary groups, the Serbian
leadership undertook draconian measures in the late 1980s to curb the upheaval.67
Thus, Kosovo's autonomous province status was removed, and the Albanian popula
tion was deprived of important civil and political rights.68
In 1999, when the former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic engaged in a
brutal tactic of oppression69 - once again in response to ethnic upheavals in Kosovo
staged by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a separatist movement operating in
Kosovo,70 the international community responded with force.71 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries launched a series of air strikes on the territory of
Serbia, which ultimately forced Milosevic to sign a peace agreement with the Kos
ovars at Rambouillet, France, in June 1999.72 Under the terms of the Rambouillet

66

67
68
69

70

71

72

tions and to have a constitutional court; judicial autonomy and the right to a Supreme
Court; the right to decide on changes of its territory; the right to ratify treaties that were
concluded with foreign states and international bodies; the right to have independent
organs and ministries within the local government.
H. H. Perritt Jr., 'Final Status for Kosovo', 80 3, Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (2005) p. 3, at p. 7
(noting that Kosovar Albanians were allowed to open an Albanian-language university
in Pristina in 1969, and that the institutional changes under the 1974 SFRY Constitution
resulted "in the growing Albanization of educational, political, and legal institutions".);
see also Gruda, supra note 31, at p. 387.
Perritt, supra note 66, at p. 8 (describing the measures undertaken by Slobodan Milos
evic beginning in 1989 to curb the Albanian upheaval).
Brown, supra note 31, at p. 263 (noting that amendments to Serbia's Constitution in 1989
and 1990 negated the Kosovar autonomy.).
Perritt, supra note 66, at p. 8 (describing the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo, accompanied by massive violence against the Kosovar Albanians by Serbian
paramilitary, military and police forces).
P. R. Williams, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict Over Kosovo's
Final Status', 31 Denv. J. Int'/ L. & Pol'y (2003) p. 387, at p. 397 (noting that as a result
of Serbian oppression, "some elements of the Kosovar Albanian population formed the
Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA''), which murdered members of the Serbian police and
military forces and perceived Kosovar Albanian collaborators"); see also Perritt, supra
note 66, at p. 8 (noting that the KLA began attacking Serbian police and military facili
ties in Kosovo).
Perritt, supra note 66, at p. 8 (indicating that NATO began its bombing campaign "aimed
at ending ethnic cleansing and protecting human rights in Kosovo"); see also I. King
and W. Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (2006) pp. 43-45
(describing the events leading up to the NATO air strikes in the former Yugoslavia).
E. Hasani, 'Self-Determination Under the Terms ofthe 2002 Union Agreement Between
Serbia and Montenegro: Tracing the Origins of Kosovo's Self-Determination', 80 Chi.
Kent L. Rev. (2005) p. 305, at p. 320 (noting that the refusal of Serbia to agree to the
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Peace Agreement and subsequently United Nations Resolution 1244, Kosovo was to
be administered by a United Nations (UN) provisional authority, the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), its safety was to be guarded by a NATO-led military
force, KFOR, and subsequent negotiations were to take place in the near future, to
decide about the true fate of the province.73
Once Milosevic stepped down as Serbia's president and leader, the Serbian out
look and its position toward the West changed.74 Under the Milosevic rule, Serbia
largely ignored the West and leaned on its historical ally, Russia, for support. After
Milosevic was ousted from power, Serbia turned toward the West. It became clear
that in order to join Western Europe - and possibly become a member ofthe European
Union (EU) - Serbia had to sacrifice Kosovo, or to at least refrain from using force
in order to prevent it from breaking off.75 The relevant players, including the Serbian
leadership, the Kosovar representatives, and UN and EU representatives, negotiated
several times, but because of strong differences about the future of Kosovo, they
were never able to reach consensus.76 In fact, Serbia, while pragmatically recog
nizing the need to accommodate Western demands,77 maintained its position that
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Rambouillet Accords caused the NATO bombing campaign); see also Brown, supra note
31, at p. 240.
See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 23 February1999,
UN Doc. S/1999/648 (7 June 1999), available at <www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/
ksvo _rambouillet_text.html>. [hereinafter "Rambouillet Accords"]. Moreover, Security
Council Resolution 1244 directly references the Rambouillet Accords for the purpose of
determining Kosovo's future status. S.C. Res. 1244, UN SCOR 54th Sess., 4011th mtg.
ifll(e), UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) [hereinafter "Resolution 1244"]. Thus, Resolution
1244 represents the legal foundation upon which "the civilian and military branches of
the international administration in Kosovo are based". Hasani, supra note 14, at p. 323;
see also Gruda, supra note 4, at p. 356. Under Resolution 1244, Kosovo was occupied by
a multilateral force (KFOR) and administered by a United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK). For a detailed discussion ofthe UN administrative regime over Kosovo under
the terms of the Rambouillet Agreement, see Hasani, supra note 72, at pp. 323-325.
Williams, supra note 70, at p. 415 (describing the political changes in Serbia as a result
ofMilosevic's removal from office).
For example, during a recent trip to Serbia, in March 2008, I witnessed a peaceful politi
cal protest on the streets ofNovi Sad, the capital of the northern province ofVojvodina,
where protesters were carrying banners with signs reading: "We have a right to the
European future" and "Don't let Kosovo slow us down". This demonstrates that a por
tion of the Serbian population seems aware of the necessity to let go of Kosovo in order
to have access into Europe.
V. Trebicka, 'Recent Development: Lessons from the Kosovo Status Talks: On Human
itarian Intervention and Self-Determination', 32 Yale J. Int'! L. (2007) p. 255, at pp.
256-258 (describing the so-called status talks on the future ofKosovo and the fact that a
"brokered political agreement ... has proven much more elusive than was first thought").
T. Garton Ash, 'This dependent independence is the least worst solution for Kosovo',
The Guardian, 21 February 2008, available at <www.guardian.co.uk/world/208/feb/21/
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Kosovo remain a territorial part of Serbia with strong regional autonomy.78 Kosovo,
on the other hand, insisted that it deserved independence.79
On 17 February 2008, backed by powerful world countries like the United
States, the United Kingdom and France, the Kosovar Parliament voted for a declara
tion of independence. 80 In the few days following the Kosovar declaration of inde
pendence, the United States, as well as about 20 EU countries formally recognized
Kosovo as a new State. 81 The recognition of Kosovo as a new State demonstrated
the willingness of recognizing nations to respect minority rights by Kosovars at the
expense of the Serbian territorial integrity. As will be discussed below, this was not
the case in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), where most ofthe Western powers
refuse to accept independence by the secessionist provinces at the expense of Geor
gian territorial integrity. 82
In October 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution
requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the issue of the Kosovar declaration
of independence. 83 More specifically, the Court was asked to opine on the legality of
the unilateral declaration of independence by the provisional government of Kosovo,
under international law. 84 The ICJ responded in the affirmative: that the unilateral
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79
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84

kosovo> (comparing the loss of Kosovo for Serbia as a loss ofa "gangrenous arm" and
concluding that this is a "precondition of recovery").
In fact, the day after the Kosovar declaration of independence, the Serbian President,
Boris Tadic, appealed to the UN Security Council to declare Kosovo's "unilateral and
illegal" declaration of independence "null and void," because Kosovo's separation vio
lates Security Council Resolution 1244 which reaffirms Serbia's sovereignty and territo
rial integrity. UNMIK News Coverage, 'Ban Ki-moon urges restraint by all sides after
Kosovo declares independence', 18 February 2008, available at: <www.unmikonline.
org/news.htm> (last visited on 12 May 2008).
Trebicka, supra note 76, at p. 255 (observing that the Kosovar Albanians have demanded
their right to self-determination, which would lead to secession).
MSNBC, 'Kosovo Declares Independence from Serbia', 18 February 2008, available at
<www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23203607> (last visited 3 June 2008).
For example, as of 18 February 2008, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and
Belgium had all expressed support for the "new state of Kosovo''. Ibid. Note however,
that several States expressed their opposition to the Kosovar independence, including
Spain, Russia, China, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. N. Kulish and C. J. Chivers, 'Kosovo is
Recognized but Rebuked by Others', The New York Times, available at <www.nytimes.
com/2008/02/19/world/europe/19kosovo.html> (19 February 2008) (last visited on 12
May 2008).
See infra Part 4.
B. M. J. Szewczyk, 'Lawfulness of Kosovo's Declaration oflndependence', 14:26 ASIL
Insight (17 August 2010), available at <www.asil.org>.
Ibid.
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declaration of independence was legal, as it was not prohibited by any rule of general
or specialized international law. 85
The Court, however, failed to address the most difficult issue raised by the Kos
ovar separation from Serbia: whether Kosovo's independence was justified under the
international law principle of remedial self-determination. The Court did discuss
the principle of territorial integrity. In fact, during this politically contentious case,
different States presented opposing arguments to the Court on the tension between
territorial integrity and self-determination. 86 Serbia and its allies argued that the prin
ciple of territorial integrity, enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
prohibited unilateral declarations of independence. 87 Kosovo and its supporters, on
the other hand, argued that the principle of territorial integrity only applied to States,
in their relations, and did not apply to non-State actors, such as the Kosovar authors
ofthe declaration of independence. 88 The Court agreed with Kosovo and held that the
principle of territorial integrity was confined to the sphere of inter-State relations,
and that declarations of independence are questions of fact and power rather than
law. 89 Thus, the Court distinguished between the principle of territorial integrity,
which is a question oflaw and applies to all States in their relations, and declarations
of independence, which are non-legal factual occurrences.90
Moreover, the Court regrettably failed to opine on the legality of the declara
tion of independence within the context of Security Council Resolution 1244. The
Resolution affirmed a commitment to "sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region". 91 Thus, Serbia
argued that the declaration of independence was inconsistent with Resolution 1244,
as it inherently violated the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugosla
via.92 The ICJ, in what one ofthe dissentingjudges labelled as a "post-hoc intellectual
construct", refused to adopt this approach and ruled instead that the authors of the
declaration of independence were not bound by Resolution 1244.93 Thus, the ICJ
passed up the opportunity to contribute toward resolving the tension between ter
ritoriality and self-determination under international law. Judge Carn;:ado-Trinidad
argued in a lengthy separate opinion that international law does provide guidance
on the legality of declarations of independence, and scholars have observed that the
Court could have taken up the opportunity to distinguish between the case ofKosovo
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

118

See Accordance with International Law ofthe Unilateral Declaration ofIndependence,
I.C.J. REPORTS 2010 (hereinafter "Accordance with International Law").
Szewczyk, supra note 83.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Accordance with International Law, supra note 85, at para. 79.
Ibid., at paras. 79-80.
S.C. Res. 1244, UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999), Annex 1, 6th princ.; Annex 2, if 8.
Szewczyk, supra note 83.
See Accordance with International Law, supra note 85 (Declaration of Vice-President
Tomka, at 3, if 12).
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and other unsuccessful cases of attempted secession.94 "Indeed, there are strong rea
sons to distinguish Kosovo's declaration of independence from, for instance, that of
South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Remedial secession may be lawful as the only possible
means to safeguard fundamental human rights so as to maximize values of human
dignity, but does not justify all territorial fragmentation." 95
Is there a legal argument that separates Kosovo from South Ossetia or Abkha
zia, as some have suggested, or is the sole difference in the political context underly
ing the two cases? Before attempting to answer this difficult question, this article will
first address the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

4.
Georgia (South Ossetia/Abkhazia)
South Ossetia is an autonomous administrative district of Georgia, and Abkhazia is
an autonomous republic also within Georgia. 96 These two provinces have functioned
as de facto States in recent years, and have spurred international controversy during
the summer of 2008, when Russia decided to support the two provinces by sending
military troops to Georgia. 97 The Russian intervention evolved into war between
Georgia on one side and Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other.
In August 2008, when the Georgian armed forces pushed into South Ossetia,
Russia accused Georgia of genocide, claiming that thousands of South Ossetian civil
ians were killed by the Georgian troops. 98 In response, Russia sent additional troops
into South Ossetia and launched air strikes on Georgian territory. 99 After a few days
of heavy fighting, Georgian troops were ejected from South Ossetia. 100 Meanwhile,
the Russian military troops stationed in Abkhazia began marching into Georgia;
this advance into Georgia was accompanied by reports of widespread looting, burn

See Szewczyk, supra note 83 (arguing that the ICJ passed up the opportunity to rule on
the more difficult issue of self-determination and territoriality); see Accordance with
International Law, supra note 85 (separate opinion of Judge Can~ado Trinidade, at 71,
'ifi[ 239-240).
95 Szewczyk, supra note 83.
96 See N. Pavlov, 'Russia, Georgia Seek Control of South Ossetia Capital', Reuters, 8
August 2008, <www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL768040420080808?pageNu
mber=2&virtualBrandChannel=>; see also 1 Council of the European Union, Indep.
Int'! Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georg (2009) at 7, 17, available at <www.
ceiig.ch>.
97 See ibid.; see also 1 Council of the European Union, ibid., at 13.
98 T. Parfitt, 'Russia Exaggerating South Ossetian Death Toll, Says Human Rights Group',
Guardian, 13 August 2008, <www.ugardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/13/geogia>; see also
1 Council of the European Union, supra note 96, at 10, 21.
99 See M. Barabanov, 'The August War Between Russia and Georgia', Moscow Defense
Brief, # 3, 2008, <www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2008/item3/articlel>; see also 1 Council of
the European Union, supra note 96, at 10.
100 See Barabanov, supra note 99; see also 1 Council of the European Union, supra note 96,
at 10-11.
94
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ing and killing of civilians by Ossetian militia. 101 On August 12, the Russian presi
dent ordered a halt to Russian military operations in Georgia, and a peace plan was
brokered by the European Union (the so-called "Medvedev-Sarkozy peace plan"),
which Russia, Georgia as well as the South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist lead
ers signed and endorsed. 102
Yet, Russia has refused to withdraw its military troops from Georgia. Russia
has also signalled no intention to end its military presence in the disputed Georgian
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.103 In fact on 25 August 2008, Russia rec
ognized these as independent States. 104 Russia now says that its troops stationed in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are guests of the newly-born nations, and their status is
not regulated by the Medvedev-Sarkozy peace plan. 105
Currently, the status of South Ossetia is being negotiated between the central
government of Georgia and the Russian-supported separatist government of South
Ossetia. 106 Recently, these negotiations have broken down in light ofRussia's decision
to reinforce the region militarily and give Russian passports to South Ossetians. 107
The government of Georgia has expressed that it views these moves as attempts
by Russia to annex the region effectively. 108 The Georgian government levels the
same criticism against Russian involvement in Abkhazia, which currently remains
101 L. Harding and J. Meikle, 'Georgian Villages Burned and Looted as Russian Tanks
Advance', Guardian, 13 August 2008, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/13/geor
gia.russia6>; see also 1 Council of the European Union, supra note 96, at 27.
102 See A. E. Kramer, 'A French-Brokered Peace Offers Russia a Rationale to Advance',
N.Y. Times, 14 August 2008, at Al (explaining the points of the peace agreement). But
see 1 Council of the European Union, supra note 96, at 22 (noting that while a ceasefire
was being negotiated, the Russian and South Ossetian forces continued their military
advances and occupied additional territories).
103 See Kramer, supra note 102.
104 See G. L. White and J. W. Miller, 'Russia Raises Ante on Separatist Georgia Regions',
Wall St. Journal 26 August 2008, at A9; 1 Council of the European Union, supra note
96, at 37 (explaining that the recognition of the two provinces by Russia hinders any
possible resolution of this problem). In addition to Russia, Nicaragua and Venezuela are
the only two other countries that recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia as States. G.
Dubinsky, 'The Exceptions that Disprove the Rule? The Impact of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia on Exceptions to the Sovereignty Principle', 34 Yale J. Int'! L. (2009) p. 241, at
p. 241.
105 See generally Kramer, supra note 102 (indicating that Russia has defined its presence
in the region as a peacekeeping measure); 1 Council of the European Union, supra note
96, at 188-189 (noting the Russian viewpoint: that its troops in the region have always
been peacekeepers and that its military action in the region was in self-defense of such
peacekeepers).
106 See White and Miller, supra note 104, at All.
107 See D. McElroy, 'South Ossetian Police Tell Georgians to Take a Russian Passport, or
Leave Their Homes', Daily Telegraph, 30 August 2008, at p. 17.
108 Ibid.
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a province of Georgia, but which operates as a de facto State. 109 For example, like in
South Ossetia, Russia has offered Russian passports to ethnic Abkhazians, and the
Russian rouble has become the de facto currency in Abkhazia. no The Abkhazian gov
ernment concluded a series of agreements with Russia, accepting the establishment
of a Russian military base in Abkhazia and offering other military advantages to
Russia within the Abkhazian territory. Thus, like in South Ossetia, Russia maintains
a strong political and military presence in Abkhazia.m
Most of the Western powers have expressed their support of Georgia and have
refused to recognise the independence plight of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.11 2
Despite strong secessionist movements in these two regions, the European Union,
NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe have refused to
recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent entities, and have repeatedly
stated that any such attempt at independence would violate the territorial integrity
of Georgia, their mother State. The United States has also refused to recognise the
legitimacy of these secessionist movements, and former US envoy and renowned
diplomat Richard Holbrooke stated that the conflict could encourage other separatist
movements in Russia. 113
Within the context of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian struggles for remedial
secession, most of the Western superpowers have emphasised the need to respect
Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity. When South Ossetians held a refer
endum in November 2006, at which time the ethnic South Ossetians and Russians
living in the province nearly unanimously opted for independence from Georgia,
both the Georgian central government as well as European authorities rejected the
results and instead urged parties to re-engage in negotiations.n4 In early 2000, then
UN Special Representative of the Secretary General Dieter Boden and the Group of
Friends of Georgia, consisting of the representatives of Russia, the United States,
Britain, France and Germany, drafted a document outlining a possible distribution
of competencies between the Abkhaz and Georgian authorities, based on a core

109 See e.g. 'West Condemns Russia Over Georgia', BBC NEWS, 26 August 2008, <news.
bbc.co. uk/2/hi/europe/7583164.stm>.
110 I. Khashig, 'Abkhaz Rush for Russian Passports', Institute for War and Peace Reporting,
21 February 2005, <iwpr.net/report-news/abkhaz-rush-russian-passports>.
111 'Russia's build-up in the Black Sea', The Palestine Telegraph, 6 September 2009, <www.
paltelegraph.com/world/asia-news/2139-russias-build-up-in-the-black-sea>.
112 See e.g. M. Sterio, 'On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans," Seces
sion, and the Great Powers' Rule', 19 Minn. J. Int'/ L. (2010) p. 137.
113 AP, 'Russia support for separatists could have ripples', NY Times, 31 August 2008.
114 CNN, 'S. Ossetia: 99% Back Independence', 13 November 2006; CoE Information
Office-Tbilisi, 'Council of Europe Secretary General calls for talks instead of"referen
dum" in the Georgian region of South Ossetia', 13 September 2006, available at <portal.
coe.ge/enews/EEVIEuyFElfTRjjwgP.php> (last visited on 3 May 2011).
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respect for Georgian territorial integrity.11 5 Moreover, at the annual Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly meeting in July
2008, the Assembly passed a resolution expressing concern over Russia's recent
moves in breakaway Abkhazia.11 6 The resolution called on the Russian authorities
to refrain from maintaining ties with the breakaway regions "in any manner that
would constitute a challenge to the sovereignty ofGeorgia" and also urged Russia "to
abide by OSCE standards and generally accepted international norms with respect
to the threat or use of force to resolve conflicts in relations with other participating
States". 117 Finally, the United Nations has reaffirmed "the commitment ofall Member
States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its
internationally recognized borders". 118
Kosovo achieved independence through a secessionist struggle at the expense
of the territorial integrity of Serbia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia have not been able
to do so. What is different in the two cases, and more importantly can the tension
between territoriality and minority rights be resolved by studying each of these
cases? This issue will be explored below.

5.

Proposed Solution: Reconciling Territorial Integrity and Minority
Rights in Kosovo and Georgia
Kosovo represents an example of a successful secessionist struggle. To the contrary,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia illustrate examples of unsuccessful self-determination
struggles, where a minority group is unable to achieve independence because of the
primacy of the mother State's territorial integrity. First, how can the two cases be
reconciled (section 5.1)? Second, how can the respect for territorial integrity of the
mother State be reconciled with the need to protect minority rights, and what conclu
sions can one draw from the examples of Kosovo and Georgia (section 5.2)?

5.1.
Reconciling Kosovo with Georgia: A Political Difference?
The South Ossetian and Russian leadership has relied on the Kosovo precedent to
argue for secession and independence from Georgia. In fact, the South Ossetian
leader has recently expressed his frustration at this lack of support by the Western
powers, by complaining that his country has not been able to become independent
although it has a better legal case for independence than Kosovo, which did become
independent. 119 Moreover, following Kosovo's declaration of independence the Rus
115 US Department of State, Bureau ofEuropean and Eurasian Affairs, 'The Abkhazia Con
flict', 28 July 2005.
116 Civil Georgia, 'OSCE PA Concerned Over Russian Moves', 3 July 2008.
117 Ibid.
118 S. C. Res. 1808, UN Doc S/2008/1808 (15 April 2008).
119 'Bush Warns Moscow Over Breakaway Autonomy', CNN.com, 25 August 2008, <www.
cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/25/russia.vote/index.html> ("We have more politi
cal-legal grounds than Kosovo to have our independence recognized ... ").
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sian Parliament released a joint statement reading: "Now that the situation in Kosovo
has become an international precedent, Russia should take into account the Kosovo
scenario...when considering ongoing territorial conflicts." 12 Contrary to these asser
tions, the United States State Department has consistently claimed that Kosovo is sui
generis, implying that no other secessionist movements could ever rely on this prec
edent.121 This article argues that the situations in Kosovo and Georgia have one major
difference: the degree of involvement by the international community. Whereas in
Kosovo, such involvement allowed for the transition toward independence, in Geor
gia no such assistance was offered to the South Ossetians and Abkhazians. This
article also argues that the international community's stance toward Kosovo and
Georgia, and its different levels of involvement in the two countries, seem more dic
tated by politics than by international law.122
Scholars have argued that Kosovo, because of the particular nature of the con
flict, deserves independence, unlike the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians. 123 Some
scholars in particular have advanced the idea of earned sovereignty, a conflict resolu
tion theory which posits that independence-seeking entities must, as a first step, share
sovereignty with their mother States. 124 According to this theory, such entities must
first prove to the outside world that they are capable of functioning as an indepen
dent actor, before they will accrue the right to seek independence. 125 Thus, Kosovo
may be an example of an entity that first shared sovereignty with Serbia, under the
Rambouillet Peace Plan and UN Resolution 1244, and that was able to subsequently
demonstrate its capacity to function independently and to achieve statehood. 126 Inter
national organizations play a significant role in the earned sovereignty model, by
brokering deals which allow for shared sovereignty between the mother State and

°

120 UNOMIG, 'Recognition may come "this year," South Ossetia leader says -report', 21
February 2008.
121 Condoleeza Rice, US Secretary of State in 2008, argued immediately after the United
States recognised Kosovo as a new State that Kosvo was sui generis. See 'Serbia Steps
Up Anti-Kosovo Pressure', Austin News, 8 February 2008, <www.nbcaustin.com/
Global/story.asp?s=7889772> (arguing that the "unusual combination of factors found
in the Kosovo situation - including the context of Yugoslavia's breakup, the history of
ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period ofU.N.
administration - are not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case").
122 For another scholarly view that the situations in Kosovo and South Ossetia and Abkhazia
should have been treated more similarly under international law, see Dubinsky, supra
note 104.
123 See e.g. Gruda, supra note 31, at p. 353.
124 See generally J. R. Hooper and P. R. Williams, 'Earned Sovereignty: The Political
Dimension', 31 Denv. J. /nt'l L. & Pol'y (2003) p. 355.
125 The theory of earned sovereignty consists of six elements. The first three core elements
include shared sovereignty, institution building, and final status determination of the
break-away entity, and the latter three elements are optional and include phased sover
eignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained sovereignty. See ibid., at p. 356.
126 See supra Part 3.
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the secessionist entity. In the case of Kosovo, the United Nations, NATO and the
European Union have all been involved in this transition period. 127 The situation in
Georgia has been different from Kosovo in this respect. While the international com
munity has been involved in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, its role has been limited
to peace keeping and negotiating peace agreements. 128 The international community
in Georgia has not contributed toward a plan of shared sovereignty, nor has it been
preparing South Ossetians and Abkhazians to assume independent decision-making.
Rather, the stance of most international entities has been to engage in peacekeeping
and to emphasize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. 129 If the inter
national community is unwilling to facilitate a plan of shared sovereignty between
the mother State and the secessionist entity (and often, such "facilitation" involves
significant diplomatic, financial and military pressure on the mother State), then the
latter may never be able to fulfil the criteria of the above-mentioned earned sover
eignty theory.
Even outside of the paradigms of this theory, the simple reality may be such
that the secessionist entity may never be able to gather enough political and military
strength to exercise independence de facto from the mother State. Thus, without
significant international involvement, most secessionist struggles will remain unsuc
cessful.130 Unfortunately, international involvement in a separatist movement often
has more to do with politics than the law, and the examples of Kosovo and Geor
gia underscore this point. Kosovo engaged in a separatist struggle against Serbia, a
country ruled by a rogue leader (Slobodan Milosevic) and labelled as the culprit in
the civil war in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia.13 1 Until recently, Serbia has had
very few allies on the international scene. The Kosovars, on the other hand, were
able to gather the support of the international community, by emphasizing the politi
cally unattractive image of Serbian leadership, by appealing to international scholars
and human rights advocates, and by demonstrating that their potential independence
would not disturb the geo-political equilibrium of the region. In fact, Kosovo's sep
aration fragmented Serbian territory and presumably undermined the stability of

127 See supra Part 3 (detailing the involvement of NATO, the United Nations, and KFOR, a

European Union peacekeeping military operation, in Kosovo).
128 See supra Part 4.
129 Ibid.
130 I, and other scholars, have written about the development of a theory of the Great

Powers' Rule, a phenomenon whereby the most powerful nations in the world (United
States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia and China) exert consid
erable influence on the international scene and often determine the outcomes of issues
such as secessionist struggles. See e.g. M. J. Kelly, 'Pulling at the Threads of Westpha
lia: "Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver"? Revolutionary International Legal Theory of
Return to Rule by the Great Powers?', 10 UCLA J. Int'/ L. and ForeignAjf. (2005) p. 361;
Sterio, supra note 112.
131 See supra Part 3.
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Serbia, an outcome that, in light of Milosevic's unpopularity in the Western world,
seemed attractive, if not desirable.
The South Ossetians and the Abkhazians have faced a different situation. They
are seeking to separate from Georgia, a country which has been largely supported
by the Western leaders and which has been viewed as potential NATO ally in the
Caucasus region. 132 Thus, disturbing the stability and territorial integrity of Georgia,
a country perceived as crucial to Western democracies because of its geographic
location and its role as a regional counter-weight against Russia, is an undesirable
outcome for most of the Western European democracies. The fact that South Osse
tia and Abkhazia are supported by Russia contributes even further to the Western
unwillingness to support these provinces' secessionist struggles. 133 Most of the west
ern world has feared the proliferation of Russian influence in the Caucasus; if South
Ossetia and Abkhazia were to gain independence from Georgia, there is a strong pos
sibility that they would become puppet States controlled by Russia.134 Despite the fact
that these provinces function de facto independently from Georgia, the international
community views this result as politically more desirable than if these provinces
obtained independence and were freely able to officially align with Russia. Interna
tional politics, as opposed to law, has played an enormous role in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, which as of now stand little chance oflegally separating from Georgia.13 5
This Article argues that their cases may not be legally different from the case of
Kosovo.

5.2.
Reconciling Territoriality with Minority Rights: A Proposed Solution
The examples of Kosovo and Georgia, where the notion of territorial integrity of the
mother State collided with the need to respect minority rights, illustrate different
approaches toward reconciling these two opposing principles. This article argues
that legally the two cases are not entirely distinct and could be reconciled through the
132 Sterio, supra note 112, at p. 174.
133 Ibid., at pp. 168-176 (discussing the various influences that the Great Powers have had
on secessionist struggles, including the one in Georgia).
134 Some reports indicate that Russia has been seeking to annex South Ossetia and Abkha
zia, thereby claiming for itself, against Georgia, a part of the Caucusus territory. See
e.g. T. Helpin, 'Kremlin announces that South Ossetia will join "one united Russian
state"', 30 August 2008, available at <www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/
article4635843.ece> (last visited on 3 May 32011) (noting Moscow's attempts to effec
tively annex South Ossetia following the 2008 war in Georgia); B. Whitmore, 'Abkha
zia and the Perils of "Independence"', 3 May 2011, available at <www.rferl.org/content/
Abkhazia_The_Perils_Of_Independence/1758008.html> (last visited on 3 May 2011)
(noting fears by Abkhazians that Russia may be effectively colonising Abkhazia).
135 See Dubinsky, supra note 104, at p. 246 ("The sizeable gap between practice and theory
of international law on the right to self-determination in the post-Soviet sphere is likely
to come into starker relief in the wake of Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.").
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development of a theory which would resolve situations where territoriality is at odds
with minority rights. In fact, the cases of Kosovo and Georgia have produced differ
ent results because ofthe different political realities surrounding these two regions.13 6
This article argues that the principle of territorial integrity may not be truly at
odds with minority rights. I agree with scholars who have argued that secession
ist movements almost always embrace a claim to territory which tends to be based
on a historical grievance. 137 The idea of self-determination, often applied toward
resolving secessionist claims, focuses on the people, and not on territory. However,
a self-determination claim relying on remedial secession inherently asserts a claim
to territory. As Lea Brilmayer has argued, "[w]hat are characterized as self-deter
mination claims are instead sometimes simple territorial disputes".13 8 Moreover, "[a]
theory of secession necessarily depends upon a theory of legitimate sovereignty over
territory".139 Thus, minority rights in the form of a secessionist claim are in fact
compatible with the principle of territorial integrity as they are both about territory.
The difficult question is how, and whether, to redraw boundaries to satisfy both the
mother State and the secessionist entity. Scholars have already announced principles
of reconciliation, which may be helpful in the context of Kosovo and Georgia. 140
First, as most secessionist claims tend to be based on the perception of some
historical grievance, where the mother State took over the land from the minority
group at some point in the past, the key inquiry should be whether the status quo
should be altered to rectify the past wrongdoing. 141 This is an important, and difficult,
issue. The secessionist minority may recognize itself that an even earlier historical
wrong may have occurred, and that the remedy for the earlier wrong may nullify the
present secessionist claim. Moreover, the secessionist minority may admit that the
status quo is important as it prevents complete anarchy from occurring, and that it
(the secessionist minority) may have in the present occupied the disputed territory
wrongfully. "Hardly a territorial boundary anywhere in the world would survive an
effort to correct all historical misdeeds. If protecting the status quo must be balanced
against rectifying past injustices, then the obvious question is how much weight to
assign each concern." 142 Thus, in determining whether to rectify a historical wrong,
one factor may be the immediacy of the historical claim. The closer in the past that
the historical grievance can be situated, the more likely it is that the wrong should
be remedied. Another factor may be the degree to which the secessionist group has

136 Other scholars would agree with me on this point. See e.g. Dubinsky, supra note 104,
at p. 246 ("why Kosovo, but not Abkhazia and South Ossetia ... has a unique claim to
independence is in the eye of the beholder.").
137 See e.g. Brilmayer, supra note 1.
138 Ibid., at p. 193.
139 Ibid., at p. 199.
140 See generally, Brilmayer, supra note 1.
141 Ibid., at p. 199
142 Ibid.
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managed to hold on to its claim.143 If a minority group has always claimed that it was
illegitimately annexed by the mother State, then the argument can be made that it
never agreed to the loss of its territory. Thus, it may make sense to allow it to secede
and reacquire its territory. Yet another factor may be whether the disputed territory
is settled predominantly by the people belonging to the secessionist minority, or if
the mother State has also moved its own natives to the disputed territory. 144 The more
mixed the population is in the disputed territory, the better the argument for the pres
ervation of status quo. Finally, an important factor may be the nature of the historical
grievance - the more heinous the historical wrongdoing toward the minority group,
the better the argument that the group should separate from the mother State. 145
None of these factors are easy to apply, but at least they point us toward the rel
evant inquiry of what amounts to a good secessionist claim, justifying the disruption
of the mother State's territorial integrity.
When a group seeks to secede, it is claiming a right to a particular piece of land,
and one must necessarily inquire into why it is entitled to that particular piece of
land, as opposed to some other piece of land - or no land at all .....When individu
als seek to secede, they are making a claim to territory....Their claim is typically
centered on a piece of land that they possessed in the past, and upon which they
claimed territorial integrity. Territorial integrity properly understood accommo
dates the principle of self-determination. Whatever conflict exists is not between
principles, but over land. 146

The application of these principles ofreconciliation between territoriality and minor
ity rights to Kosovo and Georgia leads toward similar conclusions. First, both sepa
ratist groups in Kosovo and in Georgia have always claimed the right to territory,
and have argued for remedial secession from their mother States. 147 Thus, both of the
conflicts are truly about territory, and less so about peoples. Second, both historical
claims are directed toward remedying grievances from the same post-World War I
era. The Kosovars were integrated into the territory of the newly created State of
Yugoslavia after the break-up of Austria-Hungary in 1918, and the South Ossetians
and Abkhazians became formally a part of Georgia after the creation of the Soviet
Union and its annexation of Georgia in 1921.148 Third, all minority groups in question
143
144
145
146
147
148

Ibid., at p. 200.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., at p. 201.
See supra Parts 3 and 4.
See supra Part 3 for a history of Kosovo; for a detailed historical account on South
Ossetia, see International Crisis Group, Georgia, 'Avoiding War in South Ossetia',
26 November 2004, available at <unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/
UNTC/UNPAN019224.pdf> (last visited on 3 May 2011); for a historical account on
Abkhazia, see Conciliation Resources, 'Chronology (Georgia and Abkhazia)', available
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(the Kosovars, South Ossetians and Abkhazians) have always claimed to be different
from their mother State, and have always asserted their right to secede. 149 Because
of oppressive political regimes existing in Serbia and the Soviet Union, such dissent
was at times severely repressed. 150 However, these minority groups have persevered
in their claims for independent territory over the years. Fourth, in all three seces
sionist provinces, the minority group co-existed with citizens ofthe mother State for
a number of years. 151 With increasing conflict and secessionist violence, in all three
cases non-ethnic Kosovars, South Ossetians and Abkhazians have been driven out so
that all three provinces now are mainly inhabited with titular ethnicities. 152 Finally, in
all three provinces, the historical grievance is of a similar nature. All three secession
ist groups claim that territory was theirs at some point in the past, but was taken over
by the mother State. Both mother States, Serbia and Georgia, have relied on different
points in history to assert that these territories are legitimately theirs. 153 In all three
secessionist provinces, wars and violence have occurred over the past two decades,
and human rights violations have been committed on all sides. The situation in Geor
gia may be even more complex because of Russian involvement, and the fact that this
conflict now involves not just the mother State and the minority groups, but also a
very powerful outside actor seeking to exert influence over the seceding entities. 154
The chart below examines the outlined criteria for secession for the two situations,
in Kosovo and Georgia. The chart demonstrates that the criteria should lead toward
the same result for all three separatist groups, either justifying secession for all, or
denying it. The chart also demonstrates that the disparity in results which occurred
de facto could not be legally explained.

149

150
151
152
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May 2011).
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Separatist
Group/"People"

Has the People
Immediacy of
Historical Claim Held on to its
Claim?

Kosovar Alba
nians

Post World War I

Yes

Is Disputed
Territory Settled
Predominantly
by the People?
Yes

South Ossetians

Post World War I

Yes

Yes

Abkhazians

Post World War I

Yes

Yes

Nature of His
torical Griev
ance
Alleged human
rights abuses
by mother State
(Serbia)
Alleged military
involvement and
some abuses by
mother State
(Georgia)
Alleged military
involvement and
some abuses by
mother State
(Georgia)

Thus, any conclusions over how to reconcile territoriality and minority rights in
Kosovo and Georgia are difficult to draw. Yet, any such conclusions should be simi
lar because of similarity inherent in the secessionist claims existing in these regions.
As this paper has argued, solutions for Kosovo and Georgia have been vastly differ
ent; the difference cannot be justified in law, only in international politics. The dif
ference in political status of the mother States, Serbia and Georgia, has led toward,
respectively, the secession and recognition of Kosovo as a new State, and the official
maintenance of status quo with respect to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is an
unfortunate result. Instead of turning to politics, the international community should
look toward law for guidance. The above enumerated factors, which could be applied
in assessing the validity of a self-determination claim, would be a useful tool to poli
ticians, judges and scholars faced with the question of reconciling territoriality and
minority rights in a given region.

6.
Conclusion
As Lea Brilmayer has argued, the issue in the debate of territoriality versus minority
rights "is not a relationship between peoples and states, but a relationship between
people, states, and territory".155 The notion of self-determination is not simply about
a people, rather, in most cases, it is about land. Reconciling the territorial integrity
of a mother State with the territorial claim of a secessionist minority group entails
asking difficult questions about whether the status quo should be altered. This article
outlines relevant factors which the international community could rely upon when
examining this question and when determining the legitimacy of future secessionist
claims. This article also concludes that the cases of Kosovo and Georgia illustrate
155 Brilmayer, supra note I, at p. 179.
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situations of similar conflicts, where the application of legal criteria would have led
to similar results, but where, instead, reliance on international politics has produced
opposing outcomes. The law would have been a better guide.
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